The Dynamics of the Institutional Change and the Market Economy: An Austrian Analysis

The aim of this contribution is to exhibit the operational nature of the Austrian analyses of institutions, particularly those of Lachmann (1994; 1986; 1978; 1977; 1976; 1970). The first section briefly discuss the main features of the Austrian analysis of the market process with the aim of highlighting the necessary irruption of the institutional component. The second section aims at exhibiting the particularities of the Lachmannian analysis of institutional change. The third section proposes to make use of the Lachmannian analytical framework in order to interpret the contemporary transformations of the market economies. I particularly show the great benefit of such a framework in order to, on one side, offer some explanations of the recent financial crisis faced by the emerging economies, and on the other side, to understand the specificity as well as the coherence of the Chinese economic transition., Lachmann, Market economies, Market Process, Institutional change

The Meaning of Market : Comparing Austrian and Institutional Economics

Our contribution aims at revealing the terms of a confrontation between Austrian and Institutional schools concerning the nature and the role of markets. Such an approach is justified by, on the one hand, the characteristics shared by both theoretical traditions, and on the other by the existence of complementarity, which founds a representation of market mechanisms in terms of process. The point is that if the economic analysis of institutions constitutes an essential link in the Austrian project of building an alternative theory of markets, it is probably also the weakest one. The benefit of the confrontation is thus to draw up a theory of institutions compatible with an -Austrian- market process analysis. The analysis thus obtained, which grants a crucial place to the dynamics of institutions, builds a bridge between two traditions which have more to exchange than is usually thought, particulary in the perspective of the elaboration of an alternative theory of the market inside which time matters.Institutional Economics, Austrian Economics, Institutional Dynamics, Market Process

How to Finance the Security of the International Trade ? A Global Public Good Approach

The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. Our analysis is more specifically oriented by the issue of financing the developing countries which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed countries have already largely invested in trade security since the events of 11th September 2001. We first characterise security in the context of a global public good, before studying the financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply of the global public good security. We then presents a critical analysis of the various possible sources and instruments for financing the global public good security and propose different financing scenarios, each one based on a specific allocation of responsibilities among the players in security. We conclude by considering the role of the international institutions as project managers of the financing and implementation of the security of international trade.international, financing, global public goods, international trade, security

Competition, Co-operation and Subcontracting - Lessons from the Clothing Industry in Thailand.

A close examination of the organisation of the clothing industry in Thailand exhibits a rather paradoxical situation: although the structural features of the sector - the breaking down of the production process, high labour intensity, low asset specificity, low skilled labour - seem to legitimate a market co-ordination mechanism, it is a close, durable and multiform co-operation which cements, in Thailand, the relations between contractors and subcontractors, as well as between subcontractors themselves. We defend the idea that this kind of co-operative organisation of economic activities represents an appropriate answer to the flexibility required by ever changing markets. Co-operation is here understood as a mechanism of temporal co-ordination of economic activities which, far from substituting itself to the market co-ordination mechanism, rather completes it.Thailand, subcontracting, industrial district, competition, co-operation

Integration, Cooperation and the Financing of Innovation

The purpose of this paper is to develop a joint analysis of the organizational and financial flexibility of the innovative firm. In this way, we complete by determinants linked to financing factors the choice between integration and inter-firms co-operative agreements. We deduce the superiority of co-operation to resolve the specialization-adaptability dilemma which faced the innovative firm.financing, innovation, integration, cooperation

The institutional failures of International Monetary Fund conditionality

The conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries. Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process.International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Financial Liberalisation and Stability of the Financial System in Emerging Markets: the institutional dimension of financial crises

Emerging economies, which have implemented since the end of the 80's a process of financial liberalisation, are confronted at the same time to banking crisis. The latter highlight the role played by the institutional framework in the process of financial liberalisation. The objective of this paper is to go through the usual alternative too much/ too little market in order to explain that the success of any liberalisation process relies on the complementarity between market and intermediation. The point is that the solution to financial instability is to be found within the institutional dynamics in which emerging economies may benefit from intermediation in order to enforce the market process.market and institutions, financial liberalisation, financial crisis, emerging markets

Towards an Austrian theory of the firm

Accessible en ligne : http://gmu.edu/rae/archives/VOL12_1_1999/3_dulbecco&garrouste.pdfInternational audienc

The institutional failures of International Monetary Fund conditionality

International audienceThe conditionality employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its lending policy is one of the main themes of controversy in the debate on the new international financial architecture. The purpose of this paper is to propose an analytical framework integrating the diverse explanations of the failure of IMF conditionality. Our analysis is based on the idea that the IMF is a key player in the running of markets in a global economy. More precisely, we explain that most of the criticisms concerning conditionality should be analyzed through what we agree to call the institutional failures of IMF conditionality. These institutional failures must be appreciated at two complementary levels: the first level refers to the intrinsic bureaucratic bias of the IMF while the second deals with the inability of the IMF to manage the institutional change required for the development of market processes and hence to maintain the institutional order in recipient countries. Although the first level failures have been particularly well studied via the international public choice approach, those of the second are, at best, often reduced to a simple statement. However, analyzing both levels of institutional failure of the IMF together is not without implications for the way in which the reforms of conditionality are conceived. Indeed, by including an analysis of the second level of failures, i.e. those relating to the relationship between conditionality and domestic institutional change, the recommendation of ex-ante conditionality emanating from the public choice approach, which tackles the first level of failures, will be invalidated. Instead a new approach will be proposed that suggests the separation of the role of the IMF as financial backer from its role as adviser to countries confronted by the globalization process

Le financement de la sécurisation du commerce international pour les pays en développement - une approche en termes de bien public mondial -

The aim of this article is to identify the modalities of financing international trade security. Our analysis is more specifically oriented by the issue of financing the developing countries which must make a considerable effort to attain the required level, whereas the developed countries have already largely invested in trade security since the events of 11th September 2001. We first characterise security in the context of a global public good, before studying the financing conditions and the discriminating criteria of the supply of the global public good security. We then presents a critical analysis of the various possible sources and instruments for financing the global public good security and propose different financing scenarios, each one based on a specific allocation of responsibilities among the players in security. We conclude by considering the role of the international institutions as project managers of the financing and implementation of the security of international trade.WCO., international institutions, financing, global public goods, international trade, security